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ABSTRACT
We review a selection of the theoretical and empirical literature on human capital and growth
that appear to provide the most relevant insights for policy development in the Canadian
context. We first focus on the extension of the neo-classical growth model with the inclusion
of human capital in an open economy framework, and discuss its empirical applications to the
Canadian economy. We also examine other issues such as the returns to education and the
distance from the technological frontier, the microeconomic versus macroeconomic return to
education, and the quantity versus quality of education. Although the levels of investment in
education and the overall quality of the educational system in Canada are fairly high, we argue
that the returns of additional investments in post-secondary education could still be
substantial since Canada is relatively close to the technology frontier.
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, economic
growth was a relatively neglected topic in macro-
economics.2 Macro textbooks and courses
devoted little attention to the study of long-run
growth, and focused mostly on business cycles,
unemployment and inflation. It changed dramat-
ically, however, since the end of the 1980s when
economic growth came back to the front stage of
the mainstream economics research agenda. In
fact, economic growth now covers roughly one-
half of typical macroeconomics courses.3
With the seminal contributions of Lucas (1988)
and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), human cap-
ital has been, right from the start, one of the key
actors in modern economic growth. Human capi-
tal has been seen, with R&D, as one of the candi-
date vehicles for knowledge accumulation and
endogenous growth. As convincingly shown by
Mankiw et al. (1992), the introduction of human
capital in growth theory was necessary to reconcile
neo-classical growth predictions with the quantita-
tive aspects of economic development. 
In this article, we review parts of the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on human capital
and growth with the objective of deriving
insights about the likely effects of investment in
1 Serge Coulombe is Professor and Jean-Francois Tremblay Associate Professor in the Department of Economics
at the University of Ottawa. This is an abridged version of a paper prepared for the Strategic Policy and
Research Branch of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (Coulombe and Tremblay, 2009). Email:
Serge.Coulombe@uottawa.ca; Jean-Francois.Tremblay@uottawa.ca.
2 The last focus on economic growth in the 1960s was the so-called “Cambridge capital controversy” that
involved Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow from Cambridge, Mass. and Piero Sraffa and Joan Robinson
from Cambridge, UK.  The controversy, which was basically methodological, lacks practical interest and
might account for the disappearance of economic growth from the front scene of the economic research
agenda.
3 It should be noted though, that the recent financial crisis and the renewed interest in Keynesian eco-
nomics might well swing the pendulum back to the business cycle horizon.4 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
post-secondary education on per capita income
growth in Canada. Our review will be quite
selective, focusing only on the issues that are
most relevant for evaluating the macroeconomic
gains of post-secondary education and for
human capital policy in Canada.
After a discussion of the concept of human
capital, our review starts with a brief overview of
some theoretical considerations about the dif-
ferent approaches that have been used to analyze
the role of human capital in growth. As will be
argued below, the neo-classical growth model,
extended to take into account the accumulation
of human capital, is quite consistent with the
cross-country empirical evidence, and its open-
economy version is well suited for the analysis of
economic and productivity growth in the Cana-
dian context. As a result, this model has provided
the theoretical background for much of the
Canadian empirical literature on education and
growth. The key prediction of this open-econ-
omy growth model, for our purposes, is that the
evolution of capital and output will be largely
driven by the accumulation of human capital. As
will be discussed, this prediction appears to fit
the evidence from Canadian data.
In principle, despite the solid evidence at the
microeconomic level that education increases
wages, investment in education will only generate
macroeconomic benefits if it has real effects on
aggregate productivity. It has been alleged in the
theoretical literature that education could poten-
tially increase individual wages without having any
effect on productivity if it acts as a signalling device
by conveying information to the labour market
about the characteristics of workers (Spence,
1973). Macro-level evidence is necessary to assess
the full aggregate productivity gains from educa-
tion, including the gains that arise because of
human capital externalities not reflected in wages.
Moreover, the aggregate productivity gains of
advanced education will depend on how rapidly the
marginal benefits of education decrease with the
level of education, and on how close an economy is
from the technology frontier. Our survey will dis-
cuss the evidence about these issues.
The recent literature has devoted consider-
able attention to the measurement of human
capital. Although the empirical literature has
traditionally used years of education as indicator
of human capital, what really matters for growth
is the skills that are produced by education. We
will review the recent evidence which highlights
the critical importance of using, as human capi-
tal indicators, the measures that best proxy the
output of the education system, when assessing
the growth effects of education. The contrasting
results of recent empirical studies that use mea-
sures of human capital based on educational
inputs versus educational output suggest that
improving the quality of education may be as
important for growth, if not more important, as
increasing enrolment rates (Hanushek and
Woessmann, 2008).
In evaluating the potential growth effects of
investing in post-secondary education, it is
important to distinguish between the impact of
public education spending and that of overall
education, given that post-secondary education
is largely financed publicly in Canada. The dis-
tinction is not irrelevant because private invest-
ment in education could respond to public
investment, and raising public funds to finance
education spending will have indirect effects on
growth. Our review will discuss the evidence on
the relationship between public education
expenditures and growth.
Human Capital and Growth
In this section, we analyse the growth revival
from a human capital perspective. After an ini-
tial discussion of the concept of human capital
we highlight the key difference between endog-
enous growth and neo-classical growth. We then
synthesize the theoretical contributions of new
growth theories, underline the central role ofINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 5
human capital, and show how the new growth
approach has been the underlying theoretical
framework for a series of Canadian empirical
studies that have focused on human capital accu-
mulation. Finally, we briefly come back to the
issue of distinguishing between alternative
determinants of economic growth.
What is human capital?
‘Fourthly, of the acquired and useful abilities
of all the inhabitants or members of the society.
The acquisition of such talents, by the mainte-
nance of the acquirer during his education,
study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real
expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as
it were, in his person. Those talents, as they
make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of
that of the society to which he belongs. The
improved dexterity of a workman may be con-
sidered in the same light as a machine or instru-
ment of trade which facilitates and abridges
labour, and which, though it costs a certain
expense, repays that expense with a profit.’
(Smith, 1776 Book II, chapter 1)
As clearly demonstrated by the above quote, the
idea that part of economic activities might not be
devoted to immediate production or consump-
tion, but might rather be diverted to education,
study, or apprenticeships, is well entrenched in the
history of economic thought. Adam Smith’s idea
came back under the closed scrutiny of economists
at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s
when it was discovered, following the growth
accounting framework proposed by Solow (1957),
that a substantial proportion of U. S. economic
growth was not accounted for by the increases in
the stock of physical capital (machinery and
equipment, and structures) and labour (number of
people employed).4 Human capital was proposed
as a competitor to technological progress to
account for the Solow residual. 
The human capital concept developed sepa-
rately from the economic growth literature with
the influential works of Mincer (1958) and Becker
(1962, 1964). Mincer explained the differences in
the personal income (wage) distribution by the
investment in human capital. He analyzed how
rational agents freely determine the time they
allocate to studying (or training) or working. The
cost of studying is the direct cost of education
(tuition fees) plus forgone labour earnings, while
the return to studying comes from higher future
earnings. Initially, because the return to extra
years of education is decreasing, the value of
future earnings exceeds the cost of studying and
the individual continues to invest in education. In
equilibrium, the benefit of an extra year of
schooling equals its costs. This analysis is gener-
ally regarded as the theoretical foundation of
empirical labour economics.
To fix ideas, consider a simple production pro-
cess where output is produced using physical
capital and labour:
Output = f (physical capital, labour).
Using the best available techniques to
describe the production process f, economists
discovered at the end of the 1950s that some-
thing was missing (the Solow residual). The
growth of labour and capital could not account
for most of output growth. Along with techno-
logical growth (changes in f), human capital was
a serious candidate for a possible missing input.
People and governments spent substantial
efforts and resources in education instead of
producing output. The efforts invested have to
increase future output. The concept of human
capital measures the skills, abilities, and knowl-
edge acquired by the studying efforts. The
extended production function is:
Output = f (physical capital, labour, human capital).
Consequently, human capital affects output
and growth directly by the production process.
4 In his preface to the first edition, Becker (1964) assimilates the revival of interest in human capital after
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Two intrinsic characteristics of human capital
are that it is a stock, and that it is entirely
embedded into a person. Being a stock, like a
machine, a house, or a car, human capital has the
possibility of keeping its usefulness, or value,
through time. Like other capital goods, human
capital is the result of past investments. Invest-
ments in human capital might come from educa-
tion, studying, apprenticeship, and learning-by-
doing (experience). Like any capital good,
human capital is also subject to depreciation.
The depreciation of human capital might simply
be the result of aging and the loss of intellectual
and physical capacities. Depreciation can also
result from technological change that makes
acquired skills obsolete.
The second characteristic of human capital is
that, unlike technology, it is a private good (or
rivalrous good) that belongs only to the person
in which it is embedded. Many components of
technology or knowledge, like differential cal-
culus, are non-rivalrous or pure public goods. As
we will discuss in a later section, human capital
and technology interact in the production pro-
cess since it is the human capital level of an indi-
vidual that allows him or her to make the best
use of technology.
Level versus growth effects 
In its first phase of development, new growth
theories place the emphasis on the level versus
the growth effect of education on output.5
According to the level approach (Lucas, 1988,
and Mankiw et al., 1992), human capital is mod-
elled as an input in the production function and
has a level effect on output. In this approach,
only continuous improvements in education will
exert a sustained effect on the growth rate of
output in the long run. In the growth approach,
often refered to as the Nelson and Phelps (1966)
approach, education is an essential input in the
innovation process. Consequently, an increase
in education level increases innovation and the
long-run growth rate of the economy.
The difference between level and growth
effects loses some of its interest if the economy
adjusts only slowly and gradually to a level
shock. The voluminous empirical literature on
convergence clearly indicates that this is indeed
the case.6 The annual convergence speed to the
long-run equilibrium measured for developed
economies ranges from 2 to 5 per cent. Suppose
that an increase in human capital only has a level
effect in the long run as in the neo-classical
growth model; the slow convergence speed
implies that the adjustment, to a once-and-for-
all increase in the education level will affect the
growth rate of the economy for decades. With a
convergence speed of 2 per cent, one half of the
adjustment to the education shock will be com-
pleted after 35 years and three quarters after 70
years.  With a convergence speed of 5 per cent,
one half of the adjustment to the education
shock will be completed after 14 years and three
quarters after 28 years. Consequently, the
growth rate of the economy will be affected by
the level shock for a time span that is well
beyond the usual economic policy agenda.
The difference between level and growth rate
effects has also lost of its interest because comfort-
ing evidence was found on growth rate conver-
gence across countries and regions within
countries.7 This implies that the endogenous
growth approach which emphasizes pure long-run
growth effects lacks empirical support. Growth
rates across countries cannot at the same time con-
verge and be determined by a set of cross-country
specific institutional and policy fundamentals.
5 See for example Aghion and Howitt (1998, section 10.4)
6 On the convergence literature, refer to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
7 In the terminology of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the cross-country evidence is for conditional con-
vergence in which countries converge to different long-run equilibria that are determined, among other
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What matters for the purpose of our analysis
is that the channel by which human capital
exerts an effect on economic growth is funda-
mentally different in the two approaches. In the
level approach, human capital in an input in the
production function and what matters for living
standards is to increase the mean level of human
capital. Since it is widely recognized that indi-
vidual returns to education are decreasing (Psa-
charopoulos, 1994), the highest returns to
investment in education could possibly be found
in investment in basic education. In the growth
approach, specialized education (e.g. engineer-
ing, technical) is probably more related to inno-
vation. Consequently, investment in some
advanced skills might well be the best growth
enhancing education policy. We will come back
to this essential issue in the third section.  
The role of human capital 
in new growth theories
The key feature of the Solow growth model is
that capital accumulation faces decreasing
returns. Therefore, capital accumulation is not a
source of long-run growth. Long-run growth is
determined by technological progress and,
along a given equilibrium growth path, the rela-
tive (to other countries) living standard of a
country is determined by fundamentals such as
its population growth rate and investment ratio.
In a seminal contribution to economic growth
theory, Mankiw et al. (1992) argue that, from a
qualitative perspective, the Solow model predic-
tions pass relatively well the test of empirical
analysis. Long-run living standards across coun-
tries appear to be correlated correctly with
investment ratios (positively) and population
growth rates (negatively) and growth rates of
countries appear to converge. However, from a
quantitative point of view, the Solow growth
model does not get things right. Suppose that
the five richest countries in the world are 25
times richer than the five poorest. In the poor
countries, the population growth rate is larger
and the investment ratio is smaller than in rich
countries, as predicted by the Solow model.
However, given the predicted magnitude of the
population growth and the investment ratio
effect on output, the observed differences in the
two fundamentals can only account for a three to
one standards of living ratio between rich and
poor countries.
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that the reason for
this problem is that, in the neo-classical growth
model, long-run differences in living standards
can only be explained by capital accumulation
and, relatively speaking, capital accumulation is
not important enough as an economic activity or
driver of growth. In national income, the returns
to capital (profits) account for only one third of
total income. The rest, two thirds, is the share of
labour income. If the returns to capital
accounted for around 0.8 of national income,
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that the neo-classical
growth model would be able to capture the size
of the cross-country income gap given the mag-
nitude of the observed differences in fundamen-
tals. This spectacular increase (8 times) of the
effect of the fundamental determinants comes
from the fact that the long-run effect of a change
in the determinants is proportional to α/(1-α)
where α is the share of the return to capital in
national income. 
The solution to the quantitative puzzle is to
recognize that the return to some sort of capital
is hidden in the share of labour income. Human
capital, which is the only candidate for this role,
makes the extended neo-classical growth model
consistent with national income facts and per
capita income disparities across countries. The
extended neo-classical model has a broaden cap-
ital concept. According to Mankiw et al., based
on the comparison between the mean wage rate
and minimum wage in the United States, the
share of the returns to human capital should
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income. From an accounting point of view,
human capital is more important than physical
capital. Human capital entered modern macro-
economics by the big door: it has become a must
for a fresh Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations.
The next important research that has contrib-
uted to increase the profile of human capital
accumulation in modern macroeconomics is the
theoretical work of Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-
Martin (1995). They extend the neo-classical
growth model with human capital to the open
economy and they show that under the assump-
tion of perfect capital mobility, the convergence
speed should be infinite since capital will instan-
taneously move where its return is the highest.
Because of decreasing returns, the return to cap-
ital is higher in the poorest countries where the
capital/labour ratio is the smallest. Of course,
this prediction is rejected by the facts since con-
vergence is rather slow.
The solution adopted by Barro et al. (1995) is
to assume that human capital can only be
financed in the domestic economy. Physical cap-
ital remains perfectly mobile (with no set-up
costs) since it can be financed abroad. The main
argument raised by Barro et al. to justify their
conjecture is the impossibility of using human
capital as collateral for financing investment in
education. This assumption follows from the
intrinsic nature of human capital. In the modern
rule of law, where slavery is no longer tolerated,
future labour income cannot generally be seized
by dissatisfied creditors.8 Therefore, human
capital cannot be financed easily in a free market
economy. The financing of education becomes
even more challenging given that most invest-
ments in education are done in childhood when
the returns to investments are the highest. Con-
sequently, the financing of investment in educa-
tion has to rely on altruist behaviour from
parents, or on the intervention of the state. The
failure of credit markets to finance education is
possibly the most important efficiency rationale
for public education.
The consequence of the open economy and the
binding constraint for the financing of human
capital is that the evolution of capital and output
along a growth path is determined by the evolu-
tion of human capital. Physical (and financial)
capital does not float instantaneously in poor
economies because the lack of human capital is a
barrier to development. The return to capital is
not higher in poor economies than in rich ones
despite the fact that the physical capital/labour
ratio is smaller in poor economies. Given the
complementarity between physical and human
capital, the lack of human capital in poor econo-
mies decreases the return to physical capital. 
An overview of the canadian 
empirical evidence
As shown by the literature following Feldstein
and Horioka (1980), physical and financial capi-
tal between countries are not perfectly mobile.
Differences in rules of law, set-up costs, and
institutional and cultural heterogeneity across
countries appear to impede the mobility of capi-
tal flows.
However, as pointed out in Coulombe and
Tremblay (2001), the theoretical framework of
Barro et al. (1995) appears to be particularly well
suited to analyze regional economic develop-
ment in a country like Canada. With its financial
system largely made up of large pan-national
multibranch banks that can redistribute savings
across regions, the assumption of perfect capital
(physical and financial) mobility appears to fit
well the Canadian regional economies. Savings
can be redistributed across regions by the finan-
cial system and the provinces are relatively
homogeneous from a cultural, political and
institutional points of view, with Quebec being a
notable exception.
8 In many legal jurisdictions, divorce laws are the obvious exception to this principle.  INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 9
Coulombe and Tremblay (2001) used Cana-
dian provincial data to test the key predictions of
the model of Barro et al. (1995). They used cen-
sus data which provide indicators of human cap-
ital across the Canadian provinces since 1951.
The use of the time dimension is particularly
useful in the Canadian provincial analysis given
the limited number of cross-section units (prov-
inces) at hand.9 They used a variety of human
capital indicators based on the percentage of the
population (15-years and over, 15 to 24-years,
and 25-years and over, for males, females and
both sexes) that have achieved at least two
benchmark education levels: grade nine, and a
university degree.10 The census data were then
available on a ten year span from 1951 to 1991
and for 1996.
The key findings of Coulombe and Tremblay
(2001) are the following. First, they estimate the
share of human capital return in national income
to be around 50 per cent. As mentioned earlier,
this is precisely the share that should be attrib-
uted to human capital in order to make the neo-
classical growth model quantitative predictions
consistent with economic development facts.
Second, Coulombe and Tremblay (2001)
found that the human capital indicators based on
the total population did indeed converge at the
same speed, around 3 per cent, as per capita
income (net of government transfers to individ-
uals). Third, around 50 per cent of the relative
per capita income growth across provinces
between 1951 and 1996 appear to be explained
by the convergence process of the main human
capital indicators. Finally, based on the compar-
isons of regressions using human capital indica-
tors for the total population and for the young
cohort, Coulombe and Tremblay (2001) show
that the speed of convergence at the regional
level might have been two to three times faster if
everybody had invested in education at the same
pace as the young cohort. The relative slowness
of the convergence process, even within a feder-
ation intensively using interprovincial redistrib-
utive transfers such as Canada, can be explained
by the conjuncture of two factors: 1) the catch-
ing-up process of poor regions is driven by the
catching-up process of human capital, and 2)
only a sub-set of the population, the youth, have
a clear incentive to invest in education. 
Coulombe and Tremblay (2001) also use the
absolute convergence model to test the Barro et
al. (1995) model. In this framework, the prov-
inces converge to the same long-run equilibrium
and differences in living standards are only
accounted for by pure short-run shocks to
regional trade patterns. In this set-up, all prov-
inces will in turn be members of the poor and
the rich clubs. Obviously this framework does
not capture the relative stability of the member-
ship in the two clubs. Coulombe (2003) extends
the framework of Coulombe and Tremblay
(2001) by allowing the provinces to converge to
different long-run growth paths which are
mainly determined by relative rates of urbaniza-
tion. Even though urbanization rates have tre-
mendously increased in all provinces since
World War II, relative rates of urbanization are
quite stable and richer provinces appear to be
systematically more urbanized than the poorest.
9 The pooling of time-series and cross-section data (TSCS) allows the use of a particularly sophisticated error
term in the econometric analysis that can account for cross-section heterogeneity and time-specific shocks
that are common to all provinces. Practically speaking, Coulombe and Tremblay (2001) used time dummies,
which imply that all variables are transformed as deviations from the cross-section mean (over the entire
period). Consequently, the human capital measures used are relative data, relative to the province mean. This
procedure overcomes most of the problems encountered by the measurement of human capital across relatively
homogenous economic units.
10 The human capital indicator based on the percentage of the population with at least a university degree
appears to generate empirical results that are consistent with the neo-classical open economy growth
model of Barro et al. (1995). The data based on grade nine do not perform as well since by the end of the
sample period, almost 100 per cent of the population had at least achieved grade nine.10 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
The paper investigates if both human capital
indicators (percentage of the population with at
least a university degree) and nominal per capita
income (net of transfers to individuals) have fol-
lowed the same growth patterns toward their
long-run equilibrium.
Overall, the results support the extended
open-economy framework. Both human capital
and per capita income appear to converge at
around the same speed to their long-run growth
path determined by the urbanization rate. One-
time structural breaks to Quebec’s and Alberta’s
relative growth paths are also detected. For
Quebec, a negative structural break is detected
around 1970 and is associated with the Anglo-
phone exodus from Montreal. Both human cap-
ital and per capita income have been negatively
affected. In Alberta, per capita income has been
stimulated by the 1973 oil shock but the same
shock has exerted a significant effect on the
human capital stock of females only. Finally,
human capital appears to remain at a high level
in the relatively poor province of Nova Scotia
without generating the same income effect than
in other provinces. This result suggests that, at
the regional level, human capital accumulation
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
being richer. 
Following the methodology proposed by
Coulombe, Tremblay and Marchand (2004) for
cross-country studies, Coulombe and Tremblay
(2007) develop synthetic time series of the skills
of labour market entrants for the 10 Canadian
provinces over the 1951-2001 period from the
Canadian database of the Adult Literacy and
Lifeskills Survey (ALL). These skills data can be
considered direct measures of human capital.
Their effect on market income is then compared
to the effect of the input measure of human cap-
ital derived from the percentage of the popula-
tion with a university degree.11 Coulombe and
Tremblay (2007) use specific econometric tech-
niques to account for cross-section heterogene-
ity and interprovincial migration.
They found a significant and substantial effect
of the skills variable on regional income. Fol-
lowing the Mincerian approach in labour eco-
nomics, Coulombe and Tremblay (2007) found
that the skills acquired by one extra year of
schooling generate an increase of around 5 per
cent in per capita income. The literacy indicator
of human capital does not perform better in
econometric analysis than their traditional one
derived from university achievement. We will
revisit this in the next section.
The main result from Coulombe and Trem-
blay (2007) is synthesized geometrically in
Chart 1. The fit between the mean skill level and
per capita income disparity across the Canadian
provinces is striking. Despite the very small
number of observations (10), the slope coeffi-
cient of the relationship between the two vari-
ables is significant at the 5 per cent level and skill
disparities by themselves account for around one
half of per capita income disparities in 2003. 
The human capital data in Chart 1 is based on
the mean skill level of the non-migrant population.
Non-migrants are defined as individuals who were
residing, at the time of the survey, in the same
province as the one where they did their last year of
high school education. We focused on the non-
migrant population in this exercise to control for
the fact that the inter-provincial migration process
in Canada tends to redistribute human capital from
the poor to the rich provinces. 
Alternative determinants 
of economic growth
Human capital accumulation is one of the two
modern candidates for explaining economic
growth and development, the other one being
good institutions in the form of democracy and,
11 Market income is measured using national accounts data on per capita personal income net of government
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what Hall and Jones (1999) called, social infra-
structures. Social infrastructures might be
viewed as the set of social arrangements and
institutions that, in the framework of Olson
(2000), promote production over predation.
The debate regarding the merits of the follow-
ing two propositions: A) education causes good
institutions and growth; or, conversely, B) good
institutions cause education and growth; is an
old one going back at least to Aristotle, accord-
ing to Glaeser et al. (2004). Although a complete
survey of the issue is well beyond the scope of
this article, we will focus, for the remaining of
this section, on the link between human capital,
institutions, technological progress, and
growth. It should be pointed out, however, that
according to the evaluation of Glaeser et al.,
empirical evidence nowadays tends to favour
proposition A over B.
More generally proposition A argues that
most of economic growth could be accounted
for, and is caused by, the accumulation of factors.
As already noted, it was precisely the discovery
by Solow (1957) that a substantial portion of
economic growth was not accounted for by fac-
tor accumulation that led to the introduction of
the Solow residual, which became known as
technological progress, yet which remains for
many economists ‘the measure of our igno-
rance’. In modern economic growth, factors that
are hard to quantify such as the quality of insti-
tutions became the determinants of economic
growth through the technological progress
channel.
Another important stance of the modern liter-
ature follows Romer (1986) by emphasizing
R&D as the main driver of technological
progress and knowledge. Two points are worth
mentioning here. R&D activities are only a
small component of economic activities in
developed countries and cannot be the main
driver of economic growth. Second, as illus-
trated by the distance to the technological fron-
tier of Aghion and Howitt (2009), advanced
education appears to be a complementary input
to R&D in the growth process.
Basic versus Advanced 
Education
In this section, we first review what can be
learned from the general literature on human
capital regarding the relative contribution of
advanced and basic education to growth. Sec-
ond, we discuss recent results where the distance
to the technological frontier appears to affect
the relative returns of investing in basic versus
more advanced education. Finally, in order to
determine where Canada stands in terms of
investment in education relative to OECD
countries, and how investment is allocated
between basic and advanced education, we
present data on education attainment and educa-
tion expenditures.
Chart 1
Skill and Income Disparities in 2003
Note: Skills of non migrants and personal income (minus
transfers to individuals) 10 provinces, 2003. Loga-
rithm deviations from the cross-sectional sample
mean. Figure taken from Coulombe and Tremblay
(2007).12 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
Macroeconomic returns of primary/
secondary and post-secondary 
education
Most of the empirical literature on the effects
of education on economic growth, or standards
of living, does not estimate separately the effect
of elementary/secondary education versus the
effect of post-secondary education. This essen-
tially results from the fact that most of this liter-
ature uses average years of education as
measures of human capital. Given that the indi-
vidual return to education may be non-linear,
the estimated macroeconomic effect of average
years of schooling will not necessarily provide a
good estimate of the aggregate benefits of
investing in advanced education. If the marginal
return to human capital accumulation is
decreasing, one would expect that the growth
effects of basic education tend to be higher than
that of advanced education. 
Psacharopoulos (1994) provides cross-coun-
try evidence on Mincerian rates of return consis-
tent with decreasing marginal returns to
education. Micro-Mincerian returns measure
the percentage increase in wages resulting from
an additional year of education. Psacharopoulos
reports that the average Mincerian rate of return
is 13.4 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 10.1 per
cent for the world as a whole and 6.8 per cent for
OECD countries. If the average number of years
of schooling is around four in Sub-Saharan
Africa and around eight in the world as a whole,
one might view the average Mincerian rates of
return to be approximately 13 per cent for the
first four years of education, 10 per cent on the
next four years, and 7 per cent on years of educa-
tion above eight, as was assumed by Hall and
Jones (1999) in their cross-country growth
accounting study that focus on level differences.
In evaluating the aggregate benefits of invest-
ment in post-secondary education, it is therefore
useful to estimate the growth effects of advanced
education, rather than only those of average
years of schooling. There are a few macroeco-
nomic studies that estimate the impact of vari-
ous indicators of post-secondary attainment on
growth. The results of these macro-level studies
are quite insightful, and in fact, do not generally
provide strong evidence that the aggregate
return to advanced education are lower than the
return to basic education.
For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) looked at the effect of schooling attain-
ment on GDP growth rates in a sample of 87
countries over the 1960-2000 period, and dis-
tinguished between primary level, high-
school and college education. They found that
the average years of secondary and higher
schooling for men had a significantly positive
effect on subsequent growth while the effect
of schooling of both sexes at the primary level
was insignificant. Gemmell (1996) also found
that educational attainment at the tertiary
level had a positive effect on growth in a sam-
ple of OECD countries. 
Using Census data for Canadian provinces,
Coulombe and Tremblay (2007)12 found that
the proportion of the population that holds a
university degree has a positive effect on pro-
vincial per capita income (net of government
transfers to individuals).13 Quantitatively, the
estimated effect of university attainment is
similar to the effect of the average skills of the
population, measured from the Adult Literacy
and Lifeskills Survey. When the university
attainment and skills variables used in their
study are standardized, so that the estimates
are independent of the different scale on
which each variable is measured, the results
indicate that an increase of one standard devi-
ation in a province’s human capital, relative to
the ten-province average, leads to an increase
12 See also Coulombe and Tremblay (2001) and Coulombe (2003) for related results.
13 Provincial per capita income is measured using national accounts data on personal income.INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 13
of approximately 0.3 standard deviation in
personal income, whether human capital is
measured by university attainment or skills.
Given that the skills variable reflects the aver-
age level of education of the population, this
finding suggests that the macroeconomic
return to advanced education in Canada may
not be much lower than the return to basic
education.
Coulombe and Tremblay (2007) also esti-
mated the impact of university attainment on
provincial per capita income, while control-
ling for the average level of skills in the popu-
lation. They found that the partial effect of
university attainment remains positive and
significant. A potential interpretation for the
fact that university attainment has a positive
effect over and above the effect of skills may
be that university education provides individ-
uals with a set of complementary skills, which
taken as a whole, have a greater impact on
productivity than the general cognitive skills
measured by the Adult Literacy and Lifeskills
Survey. This effect could be part of the expla-
nation for the fact that the estimated return to
advanced education appears to be comparable
to the return on lower-level education.
Note that, even if the marginal individual
returns to education are decreasing, the macro-
economic return to post-secondary education
could be as high, or higher, than the return to
basic education if post-secondary education
generates larger externalities than basic educa-
tion. This would certainly be consistent with the
idea that much of the human capital externalities
are associated with the impact of skills on inno-
vation and technological progress (e.g. Romer,
1990), or that firms have more incentives to
invest in R&D in economies well endowed in
highly skilled individuals (e.g. Redding, 1996
and Acemoglu, 1997).
Returns on education and the 
distance from the technology 
frontier
Other interesting findings on the relative
macroeconomic returns of higher versus more
basic education come out of the distance to
frontier model of Vandenbussche, Aghion,
and Meghir (2006).14 According to their theo-
retical model, a marginal increase in the pop-
ulation with higher education has a larger
effect on a country’s total factor productivity
growth the closer the economy is to the world
technology frontier. This result follows from
the idea that workers with higher education
will contribute more to productivity if they
are employed in the innovation, rather than
the imitation, sector. The innovation sector is
concentrated in countries that are close to the
technology frontier.
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and Aghion,
Boustan, Hoxby, and Vandenbussche (2005) test
the prediction of the distance to frontier model
using OECD data and data for U.S. states. In
Vandenbussche et al. (2006), the distance to the
frontier in country i is measured by the relative
gap between this country’s total factor produc-
tivity and the total factor productivity of the
United States. 
The key result from Vandenbussche et al.
(2006) rests on the interaction terms between
the fraction of the labour force with higher edu-
cation and the distance to the frontier. It appears
that the closer the economy is to the frontier, the
higher is the return to advanced education. Sim-
ilarly, the results from Aghion et al. (2005) sug-
gest that the return from expenditures on
universities that are research- oriented is large
in states that are closer to the frontier. By the
same token, the return on spending on two years
of college education is larger in states that are far
from the frontier.   
14 For a synthesis of this approach, refer to Aghion and Howitt (2009, section 13.4).14 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
Where does Canada stand in terms 
of education attainment and 
expenditures?
Levels of education investment in Canada are
generally quite high relative to OECD coun-
tries. Table 1 presents data on attainment rates
for upper secondary education and tertiary edu-
cation in OECD countries in 2005. In Canada,
the percentage of the population that has
attained at least upper secondary education is 86
per cent among individuals who are between 25
and 64 years old, and 91 per cent in the 25-34
age-group. This is considerably higher than the
OECD averages, which are 68 per cent for the
25-64 age-group and 78 per cent for the 25-34
age-group. Relative to Canada, the upper sec-
ondary attainment rate is slightly higher in the
United States in the 25-64 age-group (88 per
cent), but slightly lower in the 25-34 age-group
(87 per cent). Canada seems to do even better at
the tertiary level. While 47 per cent of the 25 to
64 years old have attained tertiary education, the
proportion reaches 55 per cent among the 25-34
years old. The corresponding OECD averages
are 27 per cent and 33 per cent. In the United
States, 39 per cent of both the 25-64 and the 25-
34 age-groups have attained tertiary educa-
tion.15 
Interestingly, as we move across age-groups
from the oldest to the youngest, there is a grow-
ing gap in tertiary attainment rates between
Canada and the United States. Among the 55-64
years old, a slightly larger proportion of Ameri-
cans have attained tertiary education (38 per
cent versus 37 per cent for Canadians). How-
ever, this proportion is higher in Canada in all
other age-groups and the gaps between Canada
and the United States are equal to 3 percentage
points, 10 percentage points and 16 percentage
points in the age-groups 45-54, 35-44 and 25-
34, respectively. This is an important trend that
may be viewed as a source of competitive advan-
tage for Canada. 
Table 2 presents some data on education
expenditures as a percentage of GDP and on
expenditures per student in 2005. Relative to the
OECD average, total expenditures as a percent-
age of GDP are slightly lower in Canada for pri-
mary, secondary and post-secondary non-
tertiary education (3.6 per cent versus an OECD
average of 3.8 per cent), but are significantly
higher at the tertiary level (2.6 per cent versus
1.5 per cent among OECD countries). The
United States spends a greater proportion of its
GDP than Canada in primary, secondary and
post-secondary non-tertiary education (3.8 per
cent), as well as in tertiary education (2.9 per
cent). As one would expect, the share of public
expenditures in tertiary education expenditures
is larger in Canada than in the United States. 
In terms of expenditures per student at the
tertiary level, Canada ranks second. It spends
considerably more than the average among
OECD countries ($13,463 versus $7,976), but it
spends considerably less than the United States
($18,656).16 
Although the levels of investment in educa-
tion in Canada are fairly high, at least relative to
the OECD average, the results of Vanden-
bussche et al. (2006) and Aghion et al. (2005)
suggest that the returns of additional invest-
ments in post-secondary education could still be
15 Data from the OECD on tertiary education includes bachelor’s degree and above, but also some vocational and
college diplomas. In Canada, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) does not allow for a clear delineation of attain-
ment between post-secondary non-tertiary (for example, CEGEP programmes designed to prepare students for
studies at the tertiary level) and some tertiary education (e.g. college diplomas focusing on occupationally
specific skills geared for entry into the labour market such as nursing). As a result, the proportion of the pop-
ulation with tertiary education is somewhat inflated.
16 It should also be noted that the OECD average tends to be pulled downwards by a number of countries
that are at much lower levels of development than Canada, such as the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary,
Korea, Mexico, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. The same caveat applies to the OECD averages for the
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substantial if Canada is relatively close to the
technology frontier. Chart 2 depicts the distance
from the technology frontier for a group of
OECD countries, including Canada. The dis-
tance from the frontier is measured as the abso-
lute value of the logarithm of the ratio of total
factor productivity of each country to total fac-
tor productivity in the United States, con-
structed from the data of Vandenbussche et al.
(2006). They measured total factor productivity
as the level of output per adult minus the level of
the capital stock per adult multiplied by the
share of capital in output. Canada does very
well, ranking second among this group of eigh-
teen developed countries.
Given Canada’s proximity to the frontier,
the analysis of Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and
Aghion et al. (2005) implies that investments
Table 1
Percentage of the Population Attaining at least Upper Secondary Education 
and Tertiary Education, 2005
Source: Education at a Glance 2008, OECD.
Upper Secondary Education Tertiary Education
Age group Age Group
25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Australia 67 80 68 63 52 33 39 33 32 26
A u s t r i a 8 08 78 47 77 11 81 91 91 81 4
B e l g i u m 6 78 27 46 05 03 24 23 52 72 2
Canada 86 91 89 85 76 47 55 51 43 37
Czech Republic 90 94 94 89 84 14 15 15 13 11
D e n m a r k 8 28 88 47 87 63 54 13 63 32 8
F i n l a n d 8 09 08 78 06 33 53 84 13 42 7
France 67 82 72 61 52 26 41 27 19 16
G e r m a n y 8 38 48 58 37 92 42 22 52 52 3
G r e e c e 5 97 56 75 33 42 22 72 62 01 3
H u n g a r y 7 88 68 27 76 61 82 11 71 71 5
I c e l a n d 6 36 76 76 45 13 03 23 42 92 1
I r e l a n d 6 68 27 15 84 13 14 23 32 41 7
I t a l y 5 16 75 54 73 21 31 71 41 1 9
K o r e a 7 79 79 06 23 73 35 33 71 91 1
Luxembourg 66 78 67 60 55 24 33 24 19 18
Mexico 32 39 36 28 17 15 19 16 15 8
N e t h e r l a n d s 7 28 17 67 06 03 03 63 03 02 5
N e w  Z e a l a n d 6 97 87 26 95 53 84 43 93 83 0
Norway 79 83 79 77 75 33 42 35 30 25
Poland 53 64 51 49 44 18 28 17 13 13
P o r t u g a l 2 84 42 82 01 21 32 01 41 1 7
Slovak Republic 87 94 91 86 70 14 17 13 14 12
S p a i n 5 06 45 54 32 72 83 93 12 21 5
Sweden 84 91 90 82 73 31 39 29 29 25
S w i t z e r l a n d 8 58 88 78 48 03 03 23 32 92 4
Turkey 28 37 25 22 15 10 13 9 9 8
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m6 97 67 06 76 13 03 73 12 92 4
United States 88 87 88 89 87 39 39 41 40 38
O E C D  a v e r a g e 6 87 87 26 55 52 73 32 82 41 916 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
in advanced education will tend to have
greater growth effects than investments in
basic education, and that the growth effects of
advanced education can still be substantial
despite the fact that tertiary attainment rates
and expenditure levels are already high rela-
tive to the OECD average. 
The attainment data discussed above indicates
that a considerably larger fraction of the popula-
tion has attained tertiary education in Canada
Table 2
Expenditure on Educational Institutions as a percentage of GDP, and Expenditures per Student on 
Educational Core Services, 2005  
Note: Expenditures per students are in US dollars and adjusted for purchasing power parities. In some countries, expenditures on all levels
of education include expenditures on pre-primary education. As a result, expenditures on primary, secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary
and tertiary education do not add up to expenditures on all levels of education.
Source: Education at a Glance 2008, OECD.
Expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Expenditures 
per student
Primary, secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary 




Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Total Total
Australia 3.4 0.7 4.1 0.8 0.8 1.6 4.3 1.5 5.8 6,856 9,544
Austria 3.5 0.2 3.7 1.2 0.1 1.3 5.2 0.4 5.5 9,046 9,952
Belgium 3.9 0.2 4.1 1.2 0.1 1.2 5.8 0.2 6.0 7,021 7,725
Canada 3.2 0.4 3.6 1.4 1.1 2.6 4.7 1.5 6.2 7,398 13,463
Czech Republic  2.7 0.3 3.0 0.8 0.2 1.0 4.1 0.6 4.6 3,801 5,234
Denmark 4.4 0.1 4.5 1.6 0.1 1.7 6.8 0.6 7.4 8,997 -
Finland 3.8 - 3.9 1.7 0.1 1.7 5.9 0.1 6.0 5,896 7,575
France 3.8 0.2 4.0 1.1 0.2 1.3 5.6 0.5 6.0 6,492 7,015
Germany 2.8 0.6 3.4 0.9 0.2 1.1 4.2 0.9 5.1 6,878 7,158
Greece 2.5 0.2 2.7 1.4 - 1.5 4.0 0.3 4.2 5,355 4,459
Hungary 3.3 0.2 3.4 0.9 0.2 1.1 5.1 0.5 5.6 3,668 4,590
Iceland 5.2 0.2 5.4 1.1 0.1 1.2 7.2 0.7 8.0 - -
Ireland 3.3 0.1 3.4 1.0 0.1 1.2 4.3 0.3 4.6 6,269 7,386
Italy 3.2 0.1 3.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 4.3 0.4 4.7 7,111 5,011
Japan 2.6 0.3 2.9 0.5 0.9 1.4 3.4 1.5 4.9 - -
Korea 3.4 0.9 4.3 0.6 1.8 2.4 4.3 2.9 7.2 5,133 6,574
Mexico 3.7 0.7 4.4 0.9 0.4 1.3 5.3 1.2 6.5 2,025 5,346
Netherlands 3.3 0.1 3.4 1.0 0.3 1.3 4.6 0.4 5.0 6,972 8,717
New Zealand  4.0 0.7 4.7 0.9 0.6 1.5 5.2 1.4 6.7 - 8,864
Norway 3.8 - - 1.3 - - 5.7 - - - 9,897
Poland 3.7 0.1 3.7 1.2 0.4 1.6 5.4 0.6 5.9 3,065 4,881
Portugal 3.8 - 3.8 0.9 0.4 1.4 5.3 0.4 5.7 5,606 6,785
Slovak Republic 2.5 0.4 2.9 0.7 0.2 0.9 3.7 0.7 4.4 2,336 4,273
Spain 2.7 0.2 2.9 0.9 0.2 1.1 4.1 0.5 4.6 6,152 7,182
Sweden 4.2 - 4.2 1.5 0.2 1.6 6.2 0.2 6.4 7,067 8,281
Switzerland 3.9 0.5 4.4 1.4 - - 5.6 - - - 13,041
United Kingdom  3.8 0.8 4.6 0.9 0.4 1.3 5.0 1.2 6.2 5,723 7,793
United States  3.5 0.3 3.8 1.0 1.9 2.9 4.8 2.3 7.1 9,006 18,656




















































































































































than in the United States. However, Bowlus and
Robinson (2005) have shown that this has not
necessarily resulted in more efficiency units of
labour, or human capital, in Canada. They find
that the difference between the number of effi-
ciency units supplied by individuals with and
without post-secondary education is much
greater in the United States. Part of this gap
seems to be explained by the fact that a larger
fraction of individuals with post-secondary edu-
cation in Canada do not have a BA degree or
higher. Thus, the average size of post-secondary
education investments may be smaller in Canada.
However, the difference in efficiency units sup-
plied by individuals with and without a BA degree
or higher is also larger in the US. In other words,
university education seems to be producing more
skills in the United States than in the Canada.
This appears consistent with the data on expendi-
tures per student discussed above. We will come
back to the distinction between the quantity and
quality of education in the next section.
Overall, the estimates of the macroeconomic
returns to advanced education discussed earlier,
and the relationship between the return on edu-
cation investments and the distance from the
technology frontier, seem to indicate that the
demand for skills in the economy adjusts to
increases in supply, in the sense that firms may
be willing to hire more skilled labour at any
given wage rate in an economy that is well
endowed in skilled labour. In other words, an
increase in the supply of skilled workers might
induce a shift of the skilled labour demand
curve. Such an adjustment on the demand side
could result from the fact that firms will have
greater incentives to invest in technologies and
in modern capital in economies where skilled
labour is abundant (e.g. Acemoglu, 1997). In
turn, these investments will increase their
demand for skilled labour.
In any case, if the economy did not have the
capacity to absorb the increasing number of
skilled individuals that enter labour markets, at
current levels of educational attainment, we
would not find relatively large macroeconomic
returns to advanced education, or that returns
on advanced education are higher in economies
that are closer to the technology frontier.
Although it is difficult to estimate the empirical
relationship between the supply of skilled work-
ers and the demand for skilled workers, the
empirical evidence discussed in this section is
consistent with the view that the Canadian econ-
omy would absorb the skills produced by addi-
tional investments in post-secondary education.
Macroeconomic Returns 
versus Individual Returns 
from Education Investments
For several reasons, individual returns to
human capital accumulation may not translate
into equivalent macroeconomic returns for an
economy as a whole. On one hand, if educa-
tion acts as a signalling device, investing in
education may have a greater effect on an
Chart 2
Distance from the Productivity Frontier
Ratio of total factor productivity to US total factor 
productivity in 2000 (absolute value of logarithm)
Source: Author's calculations using data from Vandenbussche, Aghion and
Meghir (2006).18 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
individual’s wage than on its actual productiv-
ity. As advocated in the pioneering work of
Spence (1973), holding an degree may provide
a signal to the labour market about some
unobservable characteristics of the worker
leading to a higher wage even if education
does not have any real effect on productivity.
If the job-market signalling hypothesis is
valid, the wage returns from education, esti-
mated at the individual level, may be high
even if the macroeconomic returns are low.17
This would imply that the private return to
education is higher than the social return.
On the other hand, there may be external
effects associated with human capital, implying
that part of the social return of an individual’s
education may be captured by other workers or
by the owners of other factors of production. It
is well understood that such external benefits
may arise, for example, if the human capital of
workers has a positive effect on the productivity
of co-workers, or if highly educated individuals
have a positive effect on innovation and techno-
logical progress. If human capital externalities
are substantial, the estimated macroeconomic
return of education on an economy’s aggregate
labour productivity may be greater than individ-
ual wage returns. 
From an efficiency perspective, large public
investments in education may be more difficult to
defend if the macroeconomic returns of educa-
tion are not at least in the same range as the indi-
vidual returns. Leaving aside credit constraints,
individuals will not tend to under-invest in educa-
tion if the private returns are as high as the social
returns. Given that it is very difficult to measure
the size of human capital externalities directly, the
efficiency rationale for public investment in edu-
cation relies critically on the comparison of
aggregate and individual returns from education. 
It should be noted, however, that part of the
estimated private return to skills in the Mince-
rian literature is actually shared with the public
sector through taxation. Mincerian rates of
return estimates typically used pre-tax wages as
the dependent variable. Therefore, these esti-
mates do not distinguish between the parts of
the return on education that are effectively cap-
tured privately versus publicly. Given that the
effective taxation of the return on human capital
is fairly high in Canada, as in most developed
countries, there will remain a substantial gap
between the return that is captured privately and
the full social return, even if we find that the
micro-Mincerian and macro-Mincerian returns
are in the same range. This consideration alone
strengthens considerably the efficiency case for
public investment in post-secondary education.
In any case, the empirical evidence on this
issue is quite limited, although Coulombe and
Tremblay (2007) provide evidence, based on
Canadian data, supporting the view that the
macroeconomic returns of education, in terms
of higher per capita income, are comparable to
individual wage returns. As discussed earlier,
we found that the increase in provincial per
capita income resulting from higher average
skills in the working-age population corre-
sponding to one additional year of education is
around 5 per cent. This is very close to the
increase in individual wages associated with an
extra year of schooling, estimated by Psa-
charopoulos (1994) to be 5.2 per cent in Can-
ada. Using a similar methodology and data
from fourteen OECD countries, Coulombe
and Tremblay (2006a) estimated the macro-
Mincerian rate of return to be around 7 per
cent. Again, this is remarkably close to Psa-
charopoulos’s average micro-Mincerian esti-
mate of 6.8 per cent for OECD countries.
17 Note, however, that even if the wage return from education arises because of the signal it provides to the
labour market, there may still be a positive effect at the macroeconomic level if the signals provided by educa-
tion generate better matching between firms and workers (Arrow, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975).INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 19
Using a new set of years of schooling data,
corrected for various sources of measurement
error, Cohen and Soto (2007) also find macro-
Mincerian estimates in the same range as the
micro estimates of Psacharopoulos (1994) in a
broad set of about 80 countries for the period
1970-1990. They find that the aggregate return
to an additional year of schooling in the popula-
tion is approximately 9 per cent. This study, and
those of Coulombe and Tremblay (2006a; 2007),
appear inconsistent with the presence of large
human capital externalities, which is in line with
the evidence provided by Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001) and Ciccone and Peri (2006).
Although there is little conclusive evidence on
the size of human capital externalities, the esti-
mates of macro-Mincerian rates of return tend
to reject the pure signaling hypothesis and sup-
port the view that higher educational attainment
in the working-age population does lead to sub-
stantial productivity gains at the macroeco-
nomic level for both OECD countries and
Canadian provinces. 
Human Capital: Quantity 
versus Quality
Another important condition required to
ensure that investment in education leads to
higher growth is that education be of high qual-
ity. In other words, it is important that schooling
generates high levels of skills. There has
recently been considerable interest in the litera-
ture on the distinction between the quantity and
the quality of education.
Microeconomic studies are generally per-
formed using individual data within a country,
provinces/states, or cities. Consequently, within
those jurisdictions, the other determinants in
the human capital production process (such as
the quality of education) are relatively homoge-
neous across individuals. In this case, years of
schooling are a good proxy for human capital.
Following the Mincerian tradition, the tra-
ditional stance in cross-country studies (Man-
kiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995) was to use
schooling data as a proxy of human capital.
Barro and Lee (1993 and 2001) have devel-
oped a multi-country schooling data bank à la
Mincer. But the assumption that the other
determinants are relatively homogeneous falls
when the purpose of the study is to measure
the returns to human capital using cross-
country data.18 Coulombe et al. (2004) and
Coulombe and Tremblay (2006a) argue that it
is for this reason that in many, if not most,
cross-country empirical analysis, the esti-
mated macroeconomic effect of human capital
is either inconsistent (across sexes for exam-
ple) or not significant (Benhabib and Spiegel,
1994; Islam, 1995; Caselli et al. 1996; Barro,
2001; and Pritchett 2001, among others). The
effect of human capital on economic growth is
at best nil when the sample is reduced to
OECD countries (Islam, 1995; Barro, 2001).
A more recent approach in the literature, fol-
lowing Hanushek and Kimko (2000), has opted to
directly measure human capital by making the
best use of cognitive skills tests.19 Using data from
the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS),
conducted in a group of OECD countries
between 1994 and 1998, Coulombe et al. (2004)
and Coulombe and Tremblay (2006a) compare
the effect of direct measures of human capital
with years of schooling data on the growth of 14
OECD countries. From the demographic profile
of the 16 to 65 years old, they derived synthetic
time series of the literacy level of labour market
entrants over the 1960-1995 period.20 The results
18 De la Fuente and Domenech (2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007) show that improving the quality of the school-
ing data in cross-country studies allow to estimate a more robust effect for human capital.
19 See Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) for a survey of the literature on cognitive skills and cross-country
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of their analysis suggest that direct measures of
human capital contain more information regard-
ing future growth of countries than traditional
measures based on years of schooling, as briefly
mentioned in the previous section. They compute
the macro-Mincerian returns from the growth
effect (on labour productivity) of the skills associ-
ated with one extra year of schooling to be around
7 per cent. 
The result that direct measures of cognitive
skills outperformed schooling data in cross-
country macroeconomic studies does not hold
when the study is performed using provinces
within the same country. Using IALS data from
the 2003 survey for the 10 Canadian provinces,
Coulombe and Tremblay (2007) found that cog-
nitive skills data did not outperform their earlier
(Coulombe and Tremblay 2001, Coulombe
2003) schooling data based on the percentage of
the population with at least a university degree.
This result could be explained by the fact that
the other determinants of the human capital
production function, including the quality of the
education system, may be quite similar across
Canadian provinces. Moreover, cross-country
education data may be subject to substantial
measurement error.
In the case of Canadian international immi-
grants however, Coulombe and Tremblay (2009)
show that the difference between direct mea-
sures of human capital (skills) and proxies based
on schooling data matters significantly. Based
again on the large Canadian sample of the 2003
IALS survey, they show that, on average, inter-
national immigrants to Canada have a lower skill
level but more years of schooling than the Cana-
dian-born population. They introduce the con-
cept of the skill-schooling gap to measure in a
handy manner the typical skill deficiency of the
foreign-born population in Canada. On average
and evaluated at the mean of the skill distribu-
tion, they show that the skill deficiency of Cana-
dian international immigrants corresponds to
three years of formal education in Canada. One
of these three years results from lower language
skills in either English or French. Coulombe
and Tremblay (2009) associate the remaining
two years of the skill-schooling gap to a lower
quality on average, compared to Canada, of the
schooling received by international immigrants
in their home country. This diagnostic follows
from the fact that, as in the pioneering analysis
of Borjas (1987), the skill-schooling gap is nega-
tively correlated with the per capita GDP of the
home country. The skill gap of Canadian immi-
grants is larger when they come from relatively
poor countries. This result concurs with the
main argument developed in Hanushek and
Woessmann (2008): improving human capital in
developed countries will not result only from
increasing schooling enrolments. Improving the
quality of the educational system is also an
important channel for increasing human capital
in many developed countries. 
Overall, this section has highlighted the fact that
the measurement of human capital is both complex
and critical in assessing the growth effects of edu-
cation. In addition, the discussion also suggests
that investing in post-secondary education with
the objective of increasing the quality of schooling,
rather than only increasing enrolment rates, might
be an important condition for growth.21
20 The synthetic time-series was constructed assuming that the level of skills of individuals remains constant dur-
ing their working-age lives. The level of skills of individuals who would have been 17 to 25 years old in any
given year (1960, 1965,…1995) was used as a measure of a country’s relative investment in human capital
during that period. An important limitation of this approach is that these human capital indicators do not
take into account the accumulation and depreciation of skills over the active lifetime of an individual. How-
ever, since the pooled time-series cross-section regressions conducted in Coulombe and Tremblay (2006a)
include country and period fixed effects, the results will be largely unaffected by that issue as long as the
pattern of skills accumulation and depreciation over the life cycle of the workforce is similar across countries. 
21 The unabridged version of this article (Coulombe and Tremblay, 2009) also discusses the impact public
expenditures on education have on growth and migration and the brain drain.INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 21
Conclusion
The literature on human capital and growth
is now extremely vast. We have reviewed the
parts of this literature that appear to provide
the most relevant insights for policy develop-
ment in the Canadian context. This selective
review leads us to derive the following conclu-
sions about the relationship between invest-
ment in post-secondary education and
economic growth:
• Although some early empirical studies have
expressed scepticism about whether invest-
ment in education actually has significant
effects on growth, especially in samples of
developed countries, there is now a fairly
wide consensus in the literature about the
fact that the macroeconomic gains of educa-
tion are indeed substantial. A better under-
standing of issues associated with the
measurement of human capital, as well as
the introduction in growth regressions of
direct measures of skills — the output of
educational investments — have contrib-
uted to dissipating the doubts about the
macroeconomic benefits of education.
• The Canadian empirical evidence is quite
consistent with one of the key predictions of
the open-economy neo-classical growth
model, namely that the growth of income
per capita is largely driven by the accumula-
tion of human capital. Moreover, the Cana-
dian evidence suggests that the share of the
return to human capital in national income
is around 50 per cent.
• Despite the empirical evidence of the micro-
Mincerian literature showing that the indi-
vidual marginal returns to education are
decreasing, there is little evidence that the
aggregate returns of post-secondary educa-
tion for the economy as a whole are lower
than the returns to basic education. This is
consistent with the view that an important
part of human capital externalities are asso-
ciated with the impact that highly skilled
individuals have on innovation and techno-
logical progress.
• Recent empirical evidence indicates that the
macroeconomic returns on education
depend on a country’s distance from the
world technology frontier. The benefits of
advanced education are larger in countries
that are closer to the frontier.
• Although investments in education are quite
high in Canada relative to OECD countries,
Canada’s proximity to the technology fron-
tier implies that the returns on additional
investments in post-secondary education
would likely still be substantial. Moreover,
despite the fact that post-secondary attain-
ment rates are higher in Canada than in the
United States, some recent evidence sug-
gests that the contribution of post-second-
ary education to the stock of human capital
is larger in the United States. Perhaps con-
sistent with this finding is the fact that
expenditures per student, as well as the share
of GDP investment in education, are larger
in the United States than in Canada.
• There is not much conclusive evidence
about the size of human capital externalities.
However, there is solid evidence that the
social returns to education, estimated from
the empirical macro-growth literature, are
at least comparable to the private returns,
estimated from Mincerian-wage regres-
sions. This tends to reject the job-market
signalling hypothesis according to which
education increases individual wages by pro-
viding a signal of high ability to the labour
market, rather than by having real effects on
productivity, and strengthens the efficiency
rationale for public investment in education.
• As the literature on the quantity versus the
quality of schooling suggests, the types of
investments in post-secondary education
will likely affect the size of the macroeco-22 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
nomic returns. While increasing enrolment
rates in post-secondary institutions will
likely generate aggregate benefits, the
empirical evidence suggests that improving
the quality of post-secondary education
should not be neglected and may provide the
largest benefits.
• The results from the recent literature
underlines the fact that years of schooling is
a biased proxy for human capital acquired in
different countries. This evidence questions
the principle of selecting Canadian interna-
tional immigrants using years of schooling
as an important criterion. It might be pref-
erable, from a human capital perspective, to
give higher priority to the value of potential
immigrants in the Canadian labour market. 
Overall, our reading of the theory and of the
empirical evidence leaves us with a fairly positive
view of the aggregate benefits of post-secondary
education, and of the notion that investing addi-
tional public funds in post-secondary education
would be desirable from a macroeconomic per-
spective. But, despite the rapidly growing litera-
ture on human capital and growth, there remain
several knowledge gaps. Moreover, some of our
conclusions are largely derived from interna-
tional evidence, rather than Canadian evidence.
Addressing some of these knowledge gaps and
generating additional Canadian empirical evi-
dence on some of the core issues would likely pro-
duce additional insights for policy development
and increase our level of confidence about some
of the conclusions discussed above. In our view,
some potentially important policy-oriented
research issues to address, in the Canadian con-
text, include the following:
• Explore further the relationship between
the growth impact of advanced education
and the distance from the technology fron-
tier. At the cross-country level, given our
knowledge about the fact that education
attainment rates and average years of educa-
tion are not entirely comparable across
countries, it would be useful to examine the
relationship between human capital and the
distance from the frontier by using direct
measures of skills based on test scores. The
International Adult Literacy Survey allows
to construct measures of the shares of the
population that has acquired specific levels
of skills, which would be ideal indicators of
human capital for this purpose. Relative to
the existing literature that uses schooling
attainment, this would likely provide more
reliable estimates of the macroeconomic
returns from skills, and how the returns vary
as a country gets closer to the frontier. Such
estimates could be quite insightful for pol-
icy-makers given Canada’s proximity to the
technology frontier and current levels of
education investments. At the Canadian
provincial level, the relationship between
the growth effects of advanced education
and the distance from the frontier could be
investigated using census data on secondary
and university attainment rates, given that
education systems are highly comparable
across provinces.
• Investigate the relationship between the
aggregate accumulation of skills and the
aggregate levels of investment in capital and
investment in R&D, using Canadian provin-
cial data. This would improve our under-
standing of the mechanisms explaining the
impact of skills on growth in Canada and
could lead to insightful policy implications.
A macro-level study of the relationship
between skills accumulation and capital and
R&D investment would be quite useful
since it would capture the various spillover
benefits and externalities that escape firm-
level studies.
• Some recent international studies suggest
that it would likely be interesting to estimate
the impact of public education spending onINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 23
provincial GDP growth in Canada, while
controlling for the structures of taxation.
While there is now evidence on the impact
of skills on provincial GDP growth in Can-
ada, this would provide a direct estimate of
whether financing skills investments pub-
licly generates large macroeconomic gains.
Such an analysis could possibly distinguish
between different types of education invest-
ments.
• It would be quite important to examine
empirically whether inter-provincial migra-
tion flows have an impact on the levels of
investment in post-secondary education by
provincial governments. A better under-
standing of this issue could have very impor-
tant implications for the financing of post-
secondary education.
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